



THE ASIAN CLASSICS
INSTITUTE

13

THE ART OF REASONING
Level 2 of Buddhist Logic and Perception (*Pramana*)

DHARMA ESSENTIALS





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Class One Outline

- I. Introduction to the Dharma Essentials Series and to this Course
- II. Introduction to the Texts
 - A. *Commentary on Valid Perception (Pramana Varttika, Tsema Namdrel)* by Master Dharmakirti (circa 650 AD)
 - B. Commentary by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), tutor to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, entitled *Key to the Logic Machine*
- III. Reasons to Study Buddhist Logic
 - A. Positive reasons
 - B. Negative reason
- IV. “Existing Things”
 - A. Definition of an existing thing
 - B. Unchanging and changing existing things
- V. “Working Things”
- VI. The Subject, Quality, and Reason of a Debate
- VII. Definition of a “Reason”
- VIII. Meditation Assignment

Fifteen minutes a day on examples of a changing thing and an unchanging thing and the difference between them.

Class Two Outline

I. Two Types of Relationships

- A. Identity
- B. Cause and Effect

II. Quality and Characteristic

- A. Why it is vital for those who wish to see emptiness directly
- B. Three types of “things that are general”
 - 1. Examples of each
 - 2. Things characteristic of those three types of general things

III. Definition of a “Cause”

- A. Synonyms for “cause”: “result” and “working thing”
- B. Direct and indirect causes
- C. Material causes and contributing factors

IV. Definition of a “Correct Reason”

- A. The three relationships that hold with a correct reason
 - 1. Relationship between reason and subject
 - 2. Positive necessity between reason and quality to be proven
 - 3. Negative necessity between reason and quality to be proven

V. Objections to a Logical Statement

VI. Meditation Assignment

Fifteen minutes a day on the relationship between “car” or “car-ness” and “a car” or “a Toyota.”

Class Three Outline

I. Objects

- A. The definition of an object
- B. Types of objects
- C. Five broad divisions of working things

II. Subjects or Mental Things

- A. Divisions of mental things
- B. Valid and invalid perceptions

III. Negative Things

- A. Definition of a negative thing
- B. Two kinds of negative things
 - 1. Not being something
 - 2. The absence of something

IV. Three Kinds of Correct Reasons

- A. Correct reasoning which involves a result
- B. Correct reasoning that utilizes a nature
- C. Correct reasoning to prove the absence of something

VI. Meditation Assignment

Fifteen minutes a day on the difference between positive and negative existing things.

Class Four Outline

I. Definitions

- A. Three qualities of a definition
- B. Two types of definition
- C. Three different understandings of dependent origination

II. Definitions of the Past and Future

- A. The past relative to the time of a water pitcher
- B. The future relative to the time of a water pitcher

III. The Past as a Working Thing

IV. The Elements of a Logical Statement

V. Three Types of Incorrect Logical Statements

- A. Contradictory reasons
- B. Indefinite reasons
- C. Inaccurate reasons

VI. Meditation Assignment

Fifteen minutes on why the past is a “working thing” that can affect your present.



The Asian Classics Institute
Dharma Essentials Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading One:

Selection from the collected topics:
Why Study the Art of Reasoning?

The ... selections here are from a monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine"—a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i rnam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). This text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama....

The causes that create the Buddha are consummate thoughts and actions. Proving that these constitute a totally pure path that we should practice is accomplished by using the eight different forms of logic. As such there is but one main way of keeping the teachings of the victorious Buddha safe in the world, and this is to become a master of the logical forms used to prove some things and to disprove others. As the *Goldmine of Reasoning* [by the Sakya Pandita, Kunga Gyeltsen (1182-1251)] says,

Suppose a person comes to understand
The scriptural tradition for how to reason:
This art of proving or disproving things.
A master like this is a person who keeps
The teachings of the totally enlightened
Buddhas safe here in the world....

It is always the case that, if a person is one of those disciples for whom the *Ornament* was designed, then he or she is a person who belongs to the greater

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way, and who possesses intellectual abilities which are extremely high. Think about these people—the ones who belong to the greater way and who possess an intellect which is very great. They don't begin to feel admiration for the three kinds of high knowledge simply based on the fact that someone has described to them the extraordinary qualities that these three possess. Rather they use correct forms of reasoning to come to a clear understanding of what the three—that is, foundation knowledge, path knowledge, and omniscience—really are, and they do the same to establish in their own minds the fact that neither people nor their "things" [or parts] have any nature of their own. When they have in this way come to actually see things through a valid form of perception, then they begin to have feelings of admiration for the Mother [of the Buddhas, that is the perfection of wisdom], for the three types of high knowledge—it is only then that they begin to have the kind of faith which believes in the good qualities of its object....

There is a sutra where it says,

No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall.

The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the *Commentary* with lines such as the following:

In a case where valid perception has yet
To engage in the object, the result obtained
Is that they don't: they didn't engage....

The full story behind this quotation is not often told in traditional Tibetan monasteries. It appears as an important section of the Greater Compendium of All the Sutras (Mahasutrasamuccaya, mDo kun las btus-pa chen-po), compiled by Lord Atisha (982-1052)....

"Listen to me, o child of noble family. Speaking in a way that will split up other people is a great karmic obstacle. Listen, o my child. Anyone who wants to avoid this obstacle must never feel anger about what others may do. They must trust in all that others do. They must think to themselves, 'I cannot know what this other person is really thinking. It is a difficult thing to understand all that others do.' They must come to develop this way of thinking.

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And because He had grasped this king of all ideas, the One Gone Thus then spoke the following, and thus taught the holy Dharma:

No person should ever judge another. Those who do try to judge another will only hurt themselves. Only I, or someone like me, is able to judge another.

"Listen, o child of noble family. Those who wish themselves well should never spend their time examining what anyone else at all is doing. They should never criticize another, saying 'Those people are doing this and that. This person is doing such and such.' Rather they should spend all their day, and all their night, in trying to practice the teachings of the Buddha.

"Listen, o child of noble family. A bodhisattva should never spend his time working to criticize others, for he or she must devote their whole heart to living in a pure way themselves, immersed in thoughts of the Dharma."

Formal logic subject:
The Definition of a Reason

Here is the first part of our discussion. The definition of a reason is "Anything put forth as a reason." The definition of a reason in any particular logical statement is, "Anything put forth as the reason in any particular logical statement."

It doesn't even matter if something exists or not, it can always be a reason in any particular logical statement. This is because of the fact that, no matter what something may be, it can still always be put forth as the reason in any particular logical statement. And this is true because even the horns of a rabbit can be put forth as a reason, in the following way:

Consider anything, whether it exists or not.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is the horns of a rabbit.

The definition of the reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is a changing thing is, "Anything put forth as the reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing." The definition of the reason in a logical statement where a thing which is made is used as a reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing is, "Anything put forth as the reason in a logical statement

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where a thing which is made is used as a reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing." This same pattern applies to all other cases as well....

Selection from the collected topics:
An Outline of All Existing Things

The selection here is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i rnam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). The text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama....

Here is the second major part, where we present our own position.

There does exist a definition for "that which can be established as existing,"
Because "that which can be established by a valid perception" is the definition.

There do exist two different categories for "that which can be established as existing,"
Because there exist the categories of "unchanging things" and "working things."

There does exist a definition for "unchanging thing,"
Because "one object which is both a thing and which is not such that it only lasts for a moment" is the definition of an "unchanging thing."

Things which are unchanging can be divided into two different types:
unchanging things which can be, and unchanging things which cannot be.

There does exist something which is an unchanging thing that can be,
Because "knowable things" is it.
There does exist something which is an unchanging thing that cannot be,
Because "the two of unchanging things and changing things" is it.

There does exist a definition of "working thing,"
Because "anything which performs a function" is the definition.

There exist three different kinds of working things, for there are the three of matter, mind, and active things which are neither matter nor mind. . . .

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The forms of debate: ...

Formulating the Statement of a Reason in Three Parts...

The classical presentation of a proposition in debate, after the initial challenge, has three parts, following the rules of formal logic established even as early as Lord Buddha himself. We first choose a subject, the thing we are going to debate about. One example would be "human beings." Then we choose a quality about them that we wish to prove to our opponent; for example, that they "have to die." Finally we choose a reason—which in Buddhist logic more often refers to the main thing mentioned in the reason as it is expressed—such as "being born." The entire proposition presented to the opponent then will look like this:

Consider human beings.
They do have to die,
Because they are born.

The defender listens to this proposition carefully, and then quickly prepares his answer in his mind....

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Reading Two

Reading Two:

Selection from the collected topics:
Quality and Characteristic

The selection here is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i rnam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). The text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama....

Here ... is the part where we present our own position. There does exist a definition of "something general," because "any existing thing which subsumes its members" is the definition.

Nominally speaking, things that are "general" may be divided into three different types: general things as far as types, general things as far as objects, and general things as far as collections of parts.

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as types" (or "quality"), because "that existing thing which subsumes the multiple things which are of its type" is the definition.

A classical example of a "general thing as far as types" (or "quality") does exist, because "knowable things" is one.

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as objects" (or "actual mental image") relating to a water pitcher, because it is the following: "That element which is imputed to be the water pitcher, but which is not: that thing which appears to be the water pitcher to the conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, but which is however not the water pitcher."

A classical example of a "general thing as far as objects" (or "actual mental image") does exist, because "the appearance, to the second instant of a conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, of the opposite of all that is not the water pitcher of the second instant" is just this kind of example.

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There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as a collection of parts," because it is the following: "A gross physical object which is composed of its multiple parts."

Classical examples of a "general thing as far as a collection of parts" do exist, because a water pitcher or a pillar would each be one.

There does exist one thing which is both a "general as far as a collection of parts" and a "general as far as types" (or "quality"), because the water pitcher would be one.

There does exist one thing which is both not a "general as far as a collection of parts" and yet still a "general as far as types" (or "quality"), because "knowable things" would be one.

There does exist one thing which is both not a "general as far as types" (or "quality") and yet still a "general as far as a collection of parts," because the two of a pillar and a pitcher would be one.

There does exist one thing which is neither a "general as far as types" ("quality") nor a "general as far as a collection of parts," because the two of "changing things" and "unchanging things" would be one.

There does exist a definition of a "member" (or "something characteristic of a particular quality"), because "an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it" is this very definition....

Selection from the collected topics:

Causes and Results....

There does exist a definition of a cause, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about something else.

"Cause," "result," and "working thing" all refer to the same thing.

There does exist a definition of the cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing.

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And this is true because, whenever something is a working thing, the definition of its cause is always "the thing which brings it about."

Causes for working things can be divided into two kinds: direct causes for working things and indirect causes for working things.

There does exist a definition for the direct cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing directly.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following:

A working thing as it was the moment before it.

There does exist a definition for the indirect cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing indirectly.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following:

A working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it.

These same patterns apply to the direct and indirect causes of all kinds of working things.

Causes for working things can also be divided into another two types, which are (1) material causes for working things and (2) contributing factors for working things.

There does exist a definition for the material cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything that brings about a working thing primarily as a continuation of the same material.

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There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following: the thing which is made and which acts as a cause for a working thing, [meaning here the working thing as it was the moment before—such as clay for a pot].

There does exist a definition of the contributing factor for a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything that brings about a working thing, but not primarily as a continuation of the same material.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following: a person who acts as a cause for a particular working thing; [such as a potter for a pot].

There does exist a definition of a result, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about....

Formal logic subject:

The Definition of a Correct Logical Statement, and the Three Relations

Here secondly we will explain the definition of a correct reason.

A correct reason is defined as:

A reason where the three relationships hold.

What are the three relationships? They are the following three: the relationship between the subject and the reason; the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven; and the reverse necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven. Here now we will give the definition, classical examples, and supporting arguments for each.

Here is the first. The "relationship between the subject and the reason" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the subject of the proof—the object

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about which the opponent entertains his doubt—in the way asserted.

The "positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the group of similar cases for the proof, in the way asserted.

The "reverse necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, in the way asserted, due to its relationship to the general type represented by the explicit form of the quality to be proven.

These definitions, however, are only meant to convey the principal sense of what each relationship is; something can, however, satisfy one of them and still not be a correct reason. Sound, for example, satisfies all three of these definitions in a proof that sound is a changing thing, but is none of the things defined by any of the three....

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Reading Three

Reading Three:

Selection from the collected topics:

Negative and Positive

The selection here is from a monastic textbook popularly known as The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son (Sras bsdus-grva), by Master Ngawang Trashī, the spiritual son of the great Jamyang Shepa (1648-1721)....

There does exist a definition of a negative thing, because it is the following:

A thing which must be perceived by the state of mind which perceives it directly through a process of eliminating, directly, that which it denies.

The four terms "negative thing," "exclusion," "exclusion of all other," and "reversal" all refer to the same thing.

Negative things may be divided into two different types: things that are negative in the sense of not being something, and things that are negative in the sense of the absence of something.

There does exist a definition for a "negative thing in the sense of not being something," because it is the following:

A negative thing such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.

There does exist a classic example of a negative thing in the sense of not being something, for it is "sounds are [always] changing things."

There does exist a definition for a negative thing in the sense of being an absence of something, for it is the following:

A negative thing such that the term which expresses it does not imply something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.

There does exist a classical example of a negative thing in the sense of being an absence of something, for it is the fact that no person has any nature of their own.

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Negative things may be divided into five different types:

- 1) Those which are such that the term which expresses them directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording;
- 2) Those where the term which expresses them does this implying indirectly;
- 3) Those where the term which expresses them does this implying both directly and indirectly;
- 4) Those where the term which expresses them does this implying by context;
- 5) Those which are such that the term which expresses them implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

There does exist the first type, the kind which are such that the term which expresses them directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher....

There does exist the second type of negative, the kind which are such that the term which expresses them indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day....

There does exist the third type of negative, the kind which are such that the term which expresses them both directly and indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that there exists a John Smith who is chubby, who doesn't eat during the day, and who is not thin....

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There does exist the fourth type of negative, the kind which is such that the term which expresses it implies through the context something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be where you had determined that a particular person must be either of the royal caste or the Brahmin caste, but were unsure of which; and then someone says "They are not a Brahmin." The actual wording here directly denies, in its actual wording, that they are a Brahmin, and then implies—through the context—that they are of the royal caste; and this is the process you have to go through to determine which they are.

There does exist finally that kind of negative where the term which expresses it implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that a certain Brahmin does not drink alcohol....

Formal logic subject:

Logical Statements that Use Natures

The following selection is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901)....

The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature is as follows:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and which utilizes a nature.

The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature in any particular proof is as follows:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and which utilizes a nature, in any particular proof.

The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature in any particular proof can also be defined as follows:

A reason which is (1) a correct reason in any particular proof, and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason [one that uses a nature] by virtue of the fact that anything considered the explicit quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as

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the reason is necessarily such that to be it [the reason] is to be the quality.

Here is the second step. Correct reasons that utilize a nature can be divided into two different types: correct reasons that utilize a nature and which are such that they depend on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it]; and correct reasons that utilize a nature and which are such they are free of dependency on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it].

Here is the definition of the first:

A reason which is (1) a correct reason for any particular proof which utilizes a nature; and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason by virtue of the fact that the term which expresses it suggests the thing that made it.

The definition of the second is as follows:

A reason which is (1) the same as the first part just given; and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason by virtue of the fact that the term which expresses it does not suggest the thing that made it.

The first type may be further divided into two: those which suggest the thing that made them directly, and those which do so indirectly.

Here thirdly are the classical examples. "A thing which is produced by conscious effort" and "a thing which is brought about" are examples of the first type of reason, in a proof that the sound of a ritual horn is a changing thing. "A thing which is made" is an example of the second type of reason, in a proof that sound is a changing thing. "A working thing" is an example of a correct reason which utilizes a nature and which is such it is free of dependency on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it].

A correct reason which utilizes a nature and which is employed in the proof that sound is a changing thing can also be divided in a different way. This division would be into the two of (1) correct reasons which utilize a nature and which apply to the entire group of similar cases for the proof; and (2) correct reasons which utilize a nature and which both apply and fail to apply to the group of similar cases for the proof.

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Respective examples would be the reason "a thing which is made," and the reason "something characteristic of the quality of being made."...

Formal logic subject:

Logical Statements Used to Prove an Absence of Something, and the First Category of this Type of Statement....

The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in any particular proof is as follows:

Any reason which is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and (2) such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit version of the thing which is considered the quality to be proven in the particular proof in which it acts as the reason, and also (b) a negative thing.

Correct reasons to prove the absence of something can be divided into two types: correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible [to the particular opponent], and correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is perceptible [to the particular opponent].

Here is the first. Now there is a sutra where it says,

No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall.

The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the *Commentary* with lines such as the following:

In a case where valid perception has yet
To engage in the object, the result obtained
Is that they don't: they didn't engage.

The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible in any particular proof is as follows:

Any reason which is first of all a correct reason used to prove the absence of something for the particular proof, and which is secondly such that—even though the thing which is considered the main element of all which is denied by the proof in which it serves

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as the reason does generally exist—this thing is imperceptible to the valid perceptions of a person for whom this same reason fulfills its role in the relationship between the subject and the reason....

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Reading Four

Reading Four:

Selection from the collected topics:
Definitions and the Things They Define

The following reading consists of the Presentation of Definitions and the Things They Define (mTsan-mtson gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam chung-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama....

There is a definition of something defined, because it is the following:

A case where all three of the nominal qualities are present.

There is a way of enumerating these three "nominal qualities," because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) Generally speaking, the thing should be something to be defined;
- 2) It should apply to some definitive example for it; and
- 3) It should be something defined only for whatever its definition is, and not for any other.

There is a definition of a definition, because it is the following:

A case where all three of the material qualities are present.

There is a way of enumerating these three "material qualities," because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) Generally speaking, the thing should be a definition;
- 2) It should apply to some definitive example for it; and
- 3) It should be a definition for nothing other than the thing it defines.

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There does exist a definition of what "that which performs a function" defines, because it is the following:

That case where all three of the nominal qualities pertaining to "that which performs a function" are present.

There does exist a definition of the definition of a working thing, because it is the following:

That case where all three of the material qualities pertaining to "working thing" are present.

There does exist a definition for a definitive example where all three of the nominal qualities for "that which performs a function" are present, because it is the following:

That case of "that which performs a function" where all three of the nominal qualities for "that which performs a function" are present....

We can illustrate these with a specific case. There is a definition for the object defined by "that which performs a function," because it is the following:

A case where all three of the qualities for establishing something through "that which performs a function" are present.

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for being established as something by "that which performs a function," because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be something to be defined by "that which performs a function";
- 2) It should not be something defined for any other definition than "that which performs a function"; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example of the thing to be defined by "that which performs a function."

There is a definition for the definition of a working thing, for it is the following:

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A case where all three of the qualities for establishing something as a working thing are present.

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for establishing something as a working thing, because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be a definition for "working thing";
- 2) It should not be a definition for any object to be defined other than "working thing"; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example for the definition of a working thing....

Generally speaking, definitions may be divided into two types: (1) definitions which disallow dissimilar types; and (2) definitions which disallow wrong ideas.

An example of both of these would be something like:

A state of mind which is (1) a fresh, unerring perception, and (2) which is free of conceptualization and also unmistaken.

This is a definition which is both kinds: one which disallows dissimilar types, and one which disallows wrong ideas. And this is because it is (1) a definition which disallows dissimilar types, and (2) a definition which disallows wrong ideas.

The first element mentioned is correct, because those states of mind which are dissimilar to direct valid perception are limited to precisely two: perceptions which are not valid, and deductive valid perceptions; while perceptions which are not valid are disallowed by the part of the definition that says, "fresh, unerring perception," and deductive perceptions are disallowed both by the reference in the definition to "free of conceptualization" and also by the reference to "unmistaken."

The second element mentioned is correct, because—although the references to "free of conceptualization" and to "unmistaken" each by themselves disallow dissimilar types—they each address a different wrong idea, and so both "free of conceptualization" and "unmistaken" are mentioned, to disallow these wrong ideas. Something like the sense perception where one moon appears to be two is

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also a state of mind free of conceptualization, and so someone might wonder whether it's a direct valid perception; and so the part about "unmistaken" is added to disallow this wrong idea. The [non-Buddhist] Logician School (the Nyayika) believe that direct perception is a kind of conceptualization; the part about "free of conceptualization" is added to disallow their wrong idea....

Formal logic subject:

Identifying Elements of a Logical Statement...

The following selection is taken from An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), composed by the great tutor of His Holiness the Thirteenth Dalai Lama named Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901)....

The expression "because there is no fire" is a logical reason for proving that there is no smoke on the surface of an ocean in the middle of the night in a proof where "because there is no fire" serves as the reason in the proof. "Because *there's* no fire" is not a logical reason for the same proof where that same term serves as the reason in the proof.

The expression "there is no smoke" is both (1) the quality to be proven in that same proof, where "because there is no fire" serves as the reason; and (2) that which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven for the same proof. The expression "it's smokeless" is neither of the two. This same pattern applies for the expressions such as "there are no trees" and so on.

The expression "because there is no water pitcher perceived to be there by any valid perception" is a logical reason for proving that there exists no water pitcher in a particular location where no water pitcher is perceived by any valid perception to be present. The expression "there exists no water pitcher there" is both (1) the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the same proof, where "because there is no water pitcher perceived to be there by any valid perception" is acting as the reason; and (2) that which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the same proof. This pattern follows for other cases as well....

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Selection from the collected topics:

The Concept of Time

The following selections on the concept of time (Dus-gsum gyi rnam-bzhag), are excerpted from The Collected Topics of Rato (Rva-stod bsdus-grva), by Master Chok-hla U-ser, a great master of Rato Monastery who lived about 1500 AD. This particular book is considered the "grandfather" of what came to be a separate genre of literature in Tibet: the dura (bsdus-grva), or "selected topics from the Commentary on Valid Perception (Pramana Varttika, or Tsad-ma rnam-'grel) of Master Dharmakirti (circa 650 AD)....

Here next is an analysis of the question of whether the past and the future exist or not. Generally speaking there exist no definitions for "the past" or "the future," because the past and future are not things which even exist. This is because, anything which can be established as existing must always be existing in the present [according to this school of Buddhism].

If though we were to establish the meaning of "the past" relative to a specific point of reference, we could say that the definition of its past relative to the time of a specific water pitcher could be given as follows:

Something which has, by the time of the water pitcher, already started; and which has, by the time of the water pitcher, already ended as well.

This and "the pitcher just before the pitcher" amount to the same thing.

The definition of its present relative to the time of a specific water pitcher then could be given as follows:

That one thing which is both (1) something which has already come into existence by the time of the water pitcher; and (2) which is simultaneous to the water pitcher.

The definition of its future relative to the time of a specific water pitcher, finally, could be given as follows:

That one thing which is both (1) in the act of starting at the time of the water pitcher; and (2) not yet started at the time of the water pitcher....

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Formal logic subject:

A Discussion of Incorrect Logical Statements

The following presentation on incorrect "logical" statements is excerpted from An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), by the Tutor of His Holiness the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901)....

The definition of an incorrect reason for a particular proof is:

A reason for a particular proof where the three relationships fail to hold.

Here ... are the various divisions of incorrect reasons. Although there is not, generally speaking, any such thing as an incorrect reason, we can say that there do exist the following types of incorrect reasons in specific contexts:

- 1) Contradictory reasons for specific proofs;
- 2) Indefinite reasons for specific proofs; and
- 3) Wrong reasons for specific proofs.

We will discuss the first of these in four steps: definition; divisions; classical examples; and supporting arguments.

Here is the first. The definition of a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing is:

That one thing for which (1) the relationship between the subject and the reason does hold for proving that sound is an unchanging thing; and (2) the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven also holds for proving that sound is *not* an unchanging thing.

[A classical example would be: Consider sound. It is an unchanging thing, because it is a made thing.]

Here secondly are the divisions.

Contradictory reasons can be divided into two kinds: those which have a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, and those which have a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they go both ways, [covering or not].

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Here thirdly are the classical examples. "Something that was made" is a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, in a proof that sound is not a changing thing. "Something which is a particular example of the general type called 'made things'" is a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they go both ways, in proving the same thing....

Here secondly is our explanation of an indefinite reason; we will proceed first with a definition, and then with the various divisions of this reason. Here is the first of these.

The following is the definition of an indefinite reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing:

That one thing for which (1) the relationship between the subject and the reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing does hold; (2) the reverse relationship between the reason and the subject for proving that sound is an unchanging thing does not hold; and (3) the reverse relationship between the reason and the subject for proving that sound is *not* an unchanging thing doesn't hold either.

[A classical example would be: Consider sound. It is an unchanging thing, because there is no such thing as antlers on a rabbit's head.]

Here secondly are the divisions. This kind of reason can be divided into two: unique indefinite reasons for a particular proof, and common indefinite reasons for a particular proof....

Here third is our presentation on wrong reasons. Again we proceed in two steps of definition and divisions. Here is the first.

The definition of a wrong reason for any particular proof is:

That which (1) has been put forth as a reason for a particular proof, but (2) for which the relationship between the subject and the reason does not hold.

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Here secondly are the divisions of wrong reasons for particular proofs. There are three different types:

- 1) Reasons which are wrong relative to meaning.
- 2) Reasons which are wrong relative to a state of mind.
- 3) Reasons which are wrong relative to the particular opponent....